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Abstract
We introduce the use of reinforcement learning for indirect mechanisms, working with the exist-
ing class of sequential price mechanisms, which generalizes both serial dictatorship and posted price
mechanisms and essentially characterizes all strongly obviously strategyproof mechanisms. Learning an
optimal mechanism within this class forms a partially-observable Markov decision process. We provide
rigorous conditions for when this class of mechanisms is more powerful than simpler static mechanisms,
for sufficiency or insufficiency of observation statistics for learning, and for the necessity of complex
(deep) policies. We show that our approach can learn optimal or near-optimal mechanisms in several
experimental settings.
1 Introduction
Over the last fifty years, a large body of research in microeconomics has introduced many different mech-
anisms for resource allocation. Despite the wide variety of available options, “simple” mechanisms such as
posted price and serial dictatorship are often preferred for practical applications, including housing allo-
cation [Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998], online procurement [Badanidiyuru et al., 2012], or allocation
of medical appointments [Klaus and Nichifor, 2019]. There has been considerable interest in formalizing
different notions of simplicity. Li [2017] identifies mechanisms that are particularly simple from a strategic
perspective, introducing the concept of obviously strategyproof mechanisms; under obviously strategyproof
mechanisms, it is obvious that an agent cannot profit by trying to game the system, as even the worst possible
final outcome from behaving truthfully is at least as good as the best possible outcome from any other strat-
egy. Pycia and Troyan [2019] introduce the still stronger concept of strongly obviously strategyproof (SOSP)
mechanisms, and show that this class can essentially be identified with sequential price mechanisms, where
agents are visited in turn and offered a choice from a menu of options (which may or may not include trans-
fers). SOSP mechanisms are ones in which an agent is not even required to consider her future (truthful)
actions to understand that the mechanism is obviously strategyproof.
*Author order is alphabetical. This research is funded in part by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under Coop-
erative Agreement HR00111920029. The content of the information does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the
Government, and no official endorsement should be inferred. This is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The
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Despite being simple to use, designing optimal sequential price mechanisms is often a hard task, even
when targeting common objectives, such as maximum welfare or maximum revenue. For example, in unit-
demand settings with multiple items, the problem of computing prices that maximize expected revenue
given discrete prior distributions on buyer values is NP-hard [Chen et al., 2014]. More recently, Agrawal
et al. [2020] showed a similar result for the problem of determining an optimal order in which agents will
be visited when selling a single item using posted price mechanisms.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we provide rigorous conditions for when sequential price mechanisms
(SPMs) are more powerful than simpler static mechanisms, providing a new understanding of this class
of mechanisms. We show that for all but the simplest settings, adjusting the posted prices and the order
in which agents are visited based on prior purchases improves welfare outcomes. We also introduce the
use of reinforcement learning (RL) for the design of indirect mechanisms, applying RL to the design of
optimal SPMs, and demonstrate its effectiveness across a wide range of settings with different economic
features. We will generally focus on mechanisms that optimize expected welfare. However, the framework
is completely flexible, allowing for different objectives, and in addition to welfare, we also illustrate its use
for max-min fairness and revenue.
We formulate the problem of learning an optimal SPM as a partially observable Markov decision process
(POMDP). In this POMDP, the environment (i.e., the state, transitions, and rewards) models the economic
setting, and the policy, which observes purchases and selects the next agent and prices based on those
observations, encodes the mechanism rules. Thus, solving for an optimal policy is equivalent to solving
the mechanism design problem. For the SPM class, we can directly simulate agent behavior as part of the
environment since there is a dominant-strategy equilibrium.
We give requirements on the statistic of the history of observations needed to support an optimal policy,
and we show that this statistic can be succinctly represented in the number of items and agents. We also
show that non-linear policies based on this statistic may be necessary to increase welfare. Accordingly, we
use deep-RL algorithms to learn mechanisms. We report on a comprehensive set of experimental results
for the Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) algorithm [Schulman et al., 2017]. We consider a range of
settings, from simple to more intricate, that serve to illustrate our theoretical results as well as generally
demonstrate the performance of PPO, as well as the relative performance of SPMs in comparison to simple
static mechanisms.
Further Related Work. Economic mechanisms based on sequential posted prices have been studied since
the early 2000s. Sandholm and Gilpin [2003] study take-it-or-leave-it auctions for a single item, visiting
buyers in turn and making them offers. They introduced a linear-time algorithm that, in specific settings
with two buyers, computes an optimal sequence of offers to maximize revenue. More recently, building on
the prophet inequality literature, Kleinberg and Weinberg [2012], Feldman et al. [2015], and Du¨tting et al.
[2016] derived different welfare and revenue guarantees for posted prices mechanisms for combinatorial
auctions. Klaus and Nichifor [2019] studied SPMs in settings with homogeneous items, showing that they
satisfy many desirable properties in addition to being strategyproof.
Another research thread related to our paper is that of automated mechanism design (AMD) [Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2002, 2004], which seeks to use algorithms to design mechanisms. In the subsequent years,
progress has been made in the use of machine learning for AMD Du¨tting et al. [2015], Narasimhan et al.
[2016], Duetting et al. [2019], Golowich et al. [2018], including sample complexity results [Cole and
Roughgarden, 2014, Gonczarowski and Weinberg, 2018, e.g]. There have also been important theoretical
advances, identifying polynomial-time algorithms for direct-revelation, revenue optimal mechanisms [Cai
et al., 2012a,b, 2013, e.g.]. Despite this rich research thread on direct mechanisms, the use of AMD for indi-
rect mechanisms is less well understood. Indirect mechanisms have an imperative nature (e.g., sequential, or
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multi-round), and may involve more complex agent strategies (not limited to a single report of preferences).
One strand of work has related to the use of machine learning to realize indirect versions of known mech-
anisms such as the VCG mechanism or under assumptions of truthful responses Lahaie and Parkes [2004],
Blum et al. [2004], Brero et al. [2020]. Although in a different setting than the present paper, i.e., finding
clearing prices for combinatorial auctions, much of this work also involves inference about the valuations
of agents, including Bayesian approaches Brero and Lahaie [2018]. Related to reinforcement learning, but
otherwise quite different from our setting, Shen et al. [2020] study the design of reserve prices in repeated
ad auctions, i.e., direct mechanisms, using an MDP framework to model the interaction between pricing and
agent response across multiple instantiations of a mechanism (whereas, we use a POMDP, enabling value
inference across the rounds of a single SPM). This use of RL and MDPs for the design of repeated mecha-
nisms has also been considered for matching buyer impressions to sellers on platforms such as Taobao Tang
[2017], Cai et al. [2018].
2 Preliminaries
Economic Framework. There are n agents and m indivisible items. Let [n] = {1, . . . , n} be the set of
agents and [m] be the set of items. Agents have a valuation function vi : 2[m] → R≥0 that maps bundles of
items to a real value. As a special case, a unit-demand valuation is one in which an agent has a value for
each item, and the value for a bundle is the maximum value for an item in the bundle. Let v = (v1, . . . , vn)
denote the valuation profile. We assume v is sampled from a possibly correlated value distribution D. The
designer can access this distribution D through samples from the joint distribution.
An allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a profile of disjoint bundles of items (xi ∩ xj = ∅ for every i 6= j ∈
[n]), where xi ⊆ [m] is the set of items allocated to agent i. We use sw(x,v) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(xi) to denote the
social welfare achieved by allocation x.
An economic mechanism M interacts with agents and determines an outcome, i.e., an allocation x and
transfers (payments) τ = (τ1, . . . , τn), where τi ≥ 0 is the payment by agent i. A typical design goal is to
allocate items to maximize expected social welfare, defined as Ev∼D,(x,τ ):=M(v)[sw(x,v)]. Our framework
is flexible and allows for other design goals such as revenue and max-min fairness.
Sequential Price Mechanisms. We study the family of SPMs. An SPM interacts with agents across
rounds, t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, and visits a different agent in each round. At the end of round t, the mechanism
maintains the following parameters: a temporary allocation xt of the first t agents visited, a temporary pay-
ment profile τ t, and a residual setting ρt = (ρtagents, ρ
t
items) where ρ
t
agents ⊆ [n] and ρtitems ⊆ [m] are the set
of agents yet to be visited and items still available, respectively. In each round t, (1) the mechanism picks
an agent it ∈ ρt−1agents and posts a price ptj for each available item j ∈ ρt−1items; (2) agent it selects a bundle xt
from the set of available items and is charged payment
∑
j∈xt p
t
j ; (3) the remaining items, remaining agents,
temporary allocation, and temporary payment profile are all updated accordingly. Here, it is convenient to
initialize with ρ0agents = [n], ρ
0
items = [m],x
t = (∅, . . . , ∅) and τ 0 = (0, . . . , 0).
Learning Framework. The sequential nature of SPMs, as well as the private nature of agents’ valuations,
makes it useful to formulate this problem of AMD as a partially observable Markov decision processes
(POMDP). A POMDP [Kaelbling et al., 1998] is an MDP (given by a state space S, an action space A,
a Markovian state-action-state transition probability function P(s′; s, a), and a reward function r(s, a)),
together with a possibly stochastic mapping from each action and resulting state to observations o given by
P(o; s′, a).
For SPMs, the state corresponds to the items still unallocated, agents not yet visited, a partial allocation,
and valuation functions of agents. An action determines which agent to go to next and what prices to set.
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This leads to a new state and observation, namely the item(s) picked by the agent. In this way, the state
transition is governed by agent strategies, i.e., the dominant-strategy equilibrium of SPMs. A policy defines
the rules of the mechanism. An optimal policy for a suitably defined reward function corresponds to an
optimal mechanism. Solving POMDPs requires reasoning about the belief state, i.e., the belief about the
distribution on states given a history of observations. A typical approach is to find a sufficient statistic for
the belief state, with policies defined as mappings from this statistic to actions. In the SPM setting, these
statistics may need to store different kinds of information, depending on the exact economic setting.
3 Characterization Results
In SPMs, the outcomes from previous rounds can be used to decide which agent to visit and what prices to
set in the current round. This allows prices to be personalized and adaptive, and it also allows the order in
which agents are visited to be adaptive. We next introduce some special cases.
Definition 1 (Anonymous static price (ASP) mechanisms). Prices are set at the beginning (in a potentially
random way) and are the same across rounds and for every agent.
An example of a mechanism in the ASP class is the static pricing mechanism in Feldman et al. [2015].
Definition 2 (Personalized static price (PSP) mechanisms). Prices are set at the beginning (in a potentially
random way) and are the same across rounds, but each agent might face different prices.
Beyond prices, we are also interested in the order in which agents are selected by the mechanism:
Definition 3 (Static order (SO) mechanisms). The order is set at the beginning (in a potentially random
way) and does not change across rounds.
We illustrate the relationship between the various mechanism classes in Figure 1. The ASP class is a
subset of the PSP class, which is a subset of SPM.1 Serial dictatorship (SD) mechanisms are a subset of
ASP (all payments are set to zero) and may have adaptive or static order. The random serial dictatorship
mechanism (RSD) [Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998] lies in the intersection of SD and static order (SO).
3.1 The Need for Personalized Prices and Adaptiveness
In this section, we show that personalized prices and adaptiveness are necessary for optimizing welfare,
even in surprisingly simple settings. This further motivates formulating the design problem as a POMDP
and using RL methods to find the optimal mechanism. We will return to the examples embodied in the
proofs of these propositions in our experimental work.
Define a welfare-optimal SPM to be a mechanism that optimizes expected social welfare over the class
of SPMs.
Proposition 1. There exists a setting with one item and two IID agents where the welfare-optimal SPM
mechanism must use personalized prices.
Proof. Consider a setting with one item and two IID agents where each has a valuation distributed uniformly
on the set {1, 3}. Note that it is WLOG to only consider prices of 0 and 2. One optimal mechanism first offers
the item to agent 1 at price p1 = 2. Then, if the item remains available, the mechanism offers the item to
agent 2 at price p2 = 0. No single price p can achieve OPT. If p = 0, the first agent visited might acquire
the item when they have value 1 and the other agent has value 3. If p = 2, the item will go unallocated if
both agents have value 1.
1As with PSP mechanisms, there exist ASP mechanisms that can take useful advantage of adaptive order (while holding prices
fixed); see Proposition 3.
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Figure 1: The Sequential Price Mechanism (SPM) Taxonomy.
Note that an adaptive order would not eliminate the need for personalized prices in the example used
in the proof of Proposition 1. Interestingly, we need SPMs with adaptive prices even with IID agents and
identical items.
Proposition 2. There exists a unit-demand setting with two identical items and three IID agents where the
welfare-optimal SPM must use adaptive prices.
We provide a proof sketch, and defer the full proof to Appendix A. The need for adaptive prices comes
from the need to be responsive to the remaining supply of items after the decision of the first agent: (i) if
this agent buys, then with one item and two agents left, the optimal price should be high enough to allocate
the item to a high-value agent, alternatively (ii) if this agent does not buy, subsequent prices should be low
to ensure both remaining items are allocated.
The following proposition shows that an adaptive order may be necessary, even when the optimal prices
are anonymous and static.
Proposition 3. There exists a unit-demand setting with two identical items and six agents with correlated
valuations where the welfare-optimal SPM must use an adaptive order (but anonymous static prices suffice).
We defer the proof to the Appendix A. The intuition is that the agents’ valuations are dependent, and
knowing one particular agent’s value gives important insight into the conditional distributions of the other
agents’ values. This “bellweather” agent’s value can be inferred from their decision to buy or not, and this
additional inference is necessary for ordering the remaining agents optimally. Thus the mechanism’s order
must adapt to this agent’s decision.
Even when items are identical, and agents’ value distributions are independent, both adaptive order and
adaptive prices may be necessary.
Proposition 4. There exists a unit-demand setting with two identical items and four agents with indepen-
dently (non-identically) distributed values where the welfare-optimal SPM must use both adaptive order and
adaptive prices.
We defer the proof to the Appendix A. The intuition is that one agent has both a higher “ceiling” and
higher “floor” of value compared to some of the other agents. It is optimal for the mechanism to visit other
agents in order to determine the optimal prices to offer this particular agent, and this information-gathering
process may take either one or two rounds. We present additional, fine-grained results regarding the need
for adaptive ordering of agents for SPMs in Appendix D.
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4 Learning Optimal SPMs
In this section, we cast the problem of designing an optimal SPM as a POMDP problem. Much of the
discussion relates to welfare optimality, but the framework is completely flexible and can work with other
design objectives.
We define the POMDP as follows:
• A state st = (v,xt−1, ρt−1) ∈ S is a tuple consisting of the agent valuations v, the current partial
allocation xt−1 and the residual setting ρt−1 consisting of agents not yet visited and items not yet
allocated.
• An action at = (it, pt) defines the next selected agent it and the posted prices pt.
• For the state transition, the selected agent chooses an item or bundle of items xt, leading to a new
state st+1, where the bundle xt is added to partial allocation xt−1 to form a new partial allocation xt,
and the items and agent are removed from the residual setting ρt−1 to form ρt.
• The observation ot+1 = (it, pt, xt) ∈ O consists of the item or set of items xt chosen by the agent, the
index it of the agent, and the prices the mechanism had offered the agent pt. By including the action
of the mechanism (it, pt), we ensure that the sequence of observations carries enough information to
support inference about the underlying state.
• The reward is 0 in all states except for a terminal state, where no agents or items are left. For maxi-
mizing social welfare, the reward is defined as sw(xt,v).
By delaying reward until a terminal state, we ensure that the reward does not leak useful information to
the mechanism about the private valuations of agents.
Next, we study the sufficient statistics of the history of observations, i.e., information that suffices to
determine the action of an optimal policy after any history of observation. We show the analysis is essen-
tially tight for the case of unit-demand valuations and the social welfare objective. We defer the proofs to
Appendix B.
Proposition 5. For agents with independently (non-identically) distributed valuations, with the objective of
maximizing welfare or revenue, a sufficient statistic for the POMDP is the remaining agents and remaining
items.
Interestingly, the proposition’s statement is no longer true when dealing with a more allocation-sensitive
objective such as max-min fairness.2 The next theorem reasons about a sufficient statistic for all distributions
and objectives.
Theorem 1. With correlated valuations, the allocation matrix along with the agents who have not yet re-
ceived an offer is a sufficient statistic, whatever the design objective. Moreover, there exists a unit-demand
setting with correlated valuations where the optimal policy must use a sufficient statistic of size
Ω (max{n,m} log (min{n,m})).
2Consider an instance where some agents have already arrived and been allocated, and the policy can either choose action a or
b. Action a leads to a max-min value of yet to arrive agents of 5 with probability 1/2, and 1 with probability 1/2. Action b leads to
a max-min value of yet to arrive agents of 10 with probability 1/2, and 0 with probability 1/2. If the max-min value of the partial
allocation is 2, then the optimal action to take is action a. However, if the max-min value of the partial allocation is 10, then the
optimal action is b. In particular, inference about the values of agents already allocated is important in supporting the actions of an
optimal policy, and the simple remaining agents/items statistic is not sufficient.
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For sufficiency, the allocation matrix and remaining agents always suffices to recover the entire history
of observations of any (deterministic) policy. The result follows, since there always exists deterministic, opti-
mal policies for POMDPs given the entire history of observations (this follows by the Markov property [Bell-
man, 1957]). Since the current allocation and remaining agents can be encoded inO (max{n,m} log (min{n,m}))
space, Theorem 1 also establishes that carrying the current allocation and remaining agents is necessary from
a space complexity viewpoint. Another direct corollary is that knowledge of the remaining agents and items
(linear space), and not decisions of previous agents, is not in general enough information to support optimal
policies. The problem that arises with correlated valuations comes from the need for inference about the
valuations of remaining agents.
As the next proposition shows, using a simpler statistic of just the remaining agents corresponds to a
special case of SPM.
Proposition 6. The subclass of SPMs with static, possibly personalized prices, and a static order, corre-
sponds to policies that only have access to the set of remaining agents.
We know from Theorem 1 that a sufficient statistic does not need to keep track of past prices offered
to agents. However, we will see in our experimental results that also including price information in the
history can still be beneficial. The main reason is that the sufficient statistic in Theorem 1 is non-Markovian
in settings with correlated valuations; i.e., future statistics can depend on the actions (specifically, prices
offered) to agents in earlier rounds. This non-Markovian structure can pose a practical challenge for the
speed of convergence of off-policy RL algorithms, as well as for RL algorithms that make use of advantage-
critic methods as part of the learning process, such as the PPO algorithm that we use in our experiments.
Linear Policies are Insufficient. Given access to the allocation matrix and remaining agents, it is also
interesting to understand the class of policies that are necessary to support the welfare-optimal mechanisms,
as a function of this sufficient statistic. Given input parameters x, linear policies map the input to the `th
output using a linear transformation x · θT` , where θ = {θ`}` are parameters of the policy. For the purpose
of our learning framework, x is a flattened binary allocation matrix and a binary vector of the remaining
agents. We output n + m output variables representing the scores of agents (implying an order), and the
prices of items. We are able to show that linear policies are insufficient.
Proposition 7. There exists a setting where the welfare-optimal SPM cannot be implemented via a policy
that is linear in the allocation matrix and remaining agents.
This provides support for non-linear methods for the SPM design problem, motivating the use of neural
networks.
5 Experimental results
In this section, we test the ability of standard RL algorithms to learn optimal SPMs across a wide range of
settings.
RL Algorithm. Motivated by its good performance across different domains, we report our results for the
proximal policy optimization (PPO) algorithm [Schulman et al., 2017], a policy gradient algorithm where
the learning objective is modified to prevent large gradient steps, and as implemented in OpenAI Stable
Baselines [Hill et al., 2018]. Similarly to Wu et al. [2017], Mnih et al. [2016], we run each experiment using
6 seeds and use the 3 seeds with highest average performance to plot the learning curves in figures 2 - 4.
Performance is measured periodically during training by evaluating the objective of the current policy using
a fresh set of samples. The y-axis shows the average of the performances of the 3 selected seeds. The shaded
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regions show 95% confidence intervals based on the average performances of the 3 selected seeds. This is
done to plot the benchmarks as well.
We encode the policy via a standard 2-layer multilayer perceptron (MLP) Bourlard and Wellekens [1989]
network. The policy takes as input a statistic of the history of observations (different statistics used are
described below), and outputs n+m output variables, used to determine the considered agent and the prices
in a given round. The first n outputs give agents’ weights, and agent it is selected as the highest-weight
agent among the remaining agents using a argmax over the weights. The other m weights give the prices
agent it is faced. The state transition function models agents that follow their dominant strategy, and pick a
utility-maximizing bundle given offered prices.
At the end of an episode, we calculate the reward. For social welfare, this reflects the allocation and agent
valuations; other objectives can be captured, e.g., for revenue the reward is the total payment collected, and
for max-min fairness, the reward is the minimum value across agents. We also employ variance-reduction
techniques, as is common in the RL literature [Greensmith et al., 2004, e.g.].3
In order to study trade-offs between simplicity and robustness of learned policies, we vary the statistic
of the history of observations that we make available to the policy:
1. Items/agents left, encoding which items are still available and which agents are still to be considered.
As discussed in Section 4, this is a sufficient statistic when agents have independently distributed
valuations for welfare and revenue maximization.
2. Allocation matrix that, in addition to items/agents left, encodes the temporary allocation xt at each
round t. As discussed in Section 4, this is a sufficient statistic even when agents’ valuations are corre-
lated and for all objectives.
3. Price-allocation matrix, which, in addition to items/agents left and temporary allocation, stores an
n×m real-valued matrix with the prices the agents have faced so far. As discussed in Section 4, this
can help learning performance in practice.
Baselines. We consider the following three baselines:
1. Random serial dictatorship, where the agents’ order is determined randomly, and prices are set to
zero.
2. Anonymous static prices, where we constrain policies to those that correspond to ASP mechanisms
(this is achieved by hiding all history from the policy, which forces the order and prices not to depend
on past observation or the identity of the next agent).
3. Personalized static prices, where we constrain policies to the family of PSP mechanisms (this is
achieved by only providing the policy with information about the remaining agents; see Proposition 6).
Part 1: Correlated Value Experiments (Welfare). Recognizing the role of correlations in the power that
comes from the adapativity of SPMs, we first test a setting with multiple identical copies of an item, and
agents with unit-demand and correlated values. For this, we use parameter 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 to control the amount
of correlation. We sample z ∼ U [1−δ2 , 1+δ2 ], and draw vi independently from unif(z − 1−δ2 , z + 1−δ2 ). For
δ = 0 this gives i.i.d. vi all drawn uniformly between 0 and 1. For δ = 1 this gives all identical vi = z. For
intermediary values of δ we get increasing correlation between the vi’s.
The results are reported in Figure 2. We vary the number of agents, items, and δ, controlling the level of
correlation. We show results for 20 agents and 5 identical items, and δ = 0, 0.25, 0.33, and 0.5. The POMDP
3For welfare and revenue, we subtract the optimal welfare from the achieved welfare at each episode. As the optimal welfare
does not depend on the policy, a policy maximizing this modified reward also maximizes the original objectives.
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with the price-allocation matrix statistic is able to substantially outperform the best static mechanism as well
as RSD. A dynamic approach using an allocation matrix or agents and items left also outperforms a static
mechanism, but learns more slowly than an RL policy that is provided with a price history, especially for
larger δ. Results for other combinations of agents and items (up to 30 each were tested) yield similar results.4
Part 2: Theory-driven Experiments (Welfare). Second, we look to support the theoretical results (Sec-
tion 3 and 4). We consider five different settings, each with unit-demand agents. We defer the full description
of the settings to Section C.1. In each of the settings, the optimal SPM mechanism has different features:
• Colors: the optimal SPM is an anonymous static pricing mechanism.
• Two worlds: the optimal SPM is a static mechanism but requires personalized prices.
• Inventory: the optimal SPM makes use of adaptive prices, and this outperforms the best static person-
alized price mechanism, which outperforms the best static and anonymous price mechanism.
• Kitchen sink: both types of adaptiveness are needed by the optimal SPM.
• ID: the statistic of remaining agents and items is not sufficient to support the optimal policy.
Figure 3 shows the results for the different setups. Our experiments show that (a) we are able to learn the
optimal SPM mechanism for each of the setups using deep RL algorithms; and (b) we are able to show
exactly the variation in performance suggested by theory, and depending on the type of statistics used as
input for the policy:
• In Figure 3 (a) (Colors) we get optimal performance already when learning a static anonymous price
policy.
• In Figure 3 (b) (Two worlds) a static personalized price policy performs optimally, but not a static
anonymous price policy.
• Figure 3 (c) (Inventory) adaptive policies are able to achieve optimal performance, outperforming
personalized price mechanisms, which in turn outperform anonymous price mechanisms.
• Figure 3 (d) (Kitchen sink) adaptive policies are able to learn an optimal policy that requires using
both adaptive order and adaptive prices.
• Finally, Figure 3 (e) (ID) some setups require more complex information, as policies that leverage
allocation information outperform the policy that just access remaining agents and items.
Part 3: Beyond Unit Demand, and Beyond Welfare Maximization. Third, we present additional results
for more general setups (We defer their full description to Appendix C.2):
• Additive-across-types: there are two item types, and agents have additive valuations on one unit of
each type.
• Revenue maximization: we work in the correlated setting from part one, with δ = 0.5, but for a revenue
objective.
• Max-min fairness: the goal is to maximize the minimum value achieved by an agent in an allocation,
and we consider a setting where an adaptive order is required for an optimal reward.
4Experiments with a small number of items, or close to as many items as agents, yield less-interesting results, as these problems
are much easier and all approaches achieved near-optimal welfare.
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See Figure 4. These results show the full generality of the framework, and show the promise in using
deep-RL methods for learning SPMs for varying settings. Interestingly, they also show different sensitivities
for the statistics used than in the unit-demand, welfare-maximization setting. For the additive-across-types
setting, price information has a still greater effect on the learning rate. For the max-min fairness setting,
providing the entire allocation information has a large effect on the learning process, as the objective is very
sensitive to specific parts of the allocation; this is also consistent with the fact that agents and items left do
not provide sufficient information for this objective (see the discussion following Proposition 5).
6 Conclusion
We have studied the class of SPMs, providing characterization results and formulating the optimal design
problem as a POMDP problem. Beyond studying the sufficient statistics of history to support optimal poli-
cies, we have also demonstrated the practical learnability of the class of SPMs in increasingly complex set-
tings. This work points toward many interesting open questions for future work. First, it will be interesting to
adopt policies with a fixed-size memory, for instance through LSTM methods Hochreiter and Schmidhuber
[1997], allowing the approach to potentially scale-up to very large numbers of agents and items (dispens-
ing with large, sufficient statistics). Second, it will be interesting and challenging to study settings where
there is no simple, dominant-strategy equilibrium (which will require methods to also model agent behav-
ior Phelps et al. [2002], Byde [2003], Wellman [2006], Phelps et al. [2010], Thompson and Leyton-Brown
[2013], Bu¨nz et al. [2018], Areyan Viqueira et al. [2019], Zheng et al. [2020]). Third, it is very exciting to
consider settings that also allow for communication between agents and the mechanism, and even allow for
the automated design of emergent, two-way communication (c.f., Lowe et al. [2017]).
Acknowledgment We deeply thank Zhe Feng and Nir Rosenfeld for helpful discussions and feedback.
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Figure 2: Part 1: Correlated Value, 20 agents, 5 identical items, varying correlation parameter, δ. See Fig-
ure 3 for legend.
Figure 3: Part 2: Theory-driven. (a) Colors. (b) Two Worlds. (c) Adaptive pricing. (d) Adaptive order and
pricing. (e) Allocation information.
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A Omitted Proofs of Section 3
Proposition 2. There exists a unit-demand setting with two identical items and three IID agents where the
welfare-optimal SPM must use adaptive prices.
Proof. Consider a unit-demand setting with three agents, each with value distributed uniformly and inde-
pendently on the set {1, 3}. Note that it is WLOG to only consider prices of 0 and 2, and to consider both
items having the same price. An example of a welfare-optimal mechanism is to fix an arbitrary order and
first set price p1 = 2. If the first agent does not buy, the mechanism sets prices p2 = p3 = 0 so both items
are allocated. If the first agent does buy, the mechanism next sets price p2 = 2, and then if the item remains
available, sets price p3 = 0. This mechanism achieves the optimal welfare because it always allocates both
items, and every agent with value 3 gets an item (unless all three agents have value 3).
Any welfare-optimal mechanism must set p3 = 0, because if it visits the final agent, it is optimal to
allocate the item to that agent unconditionally. The mechanism must set p1 = 2 or else it risks allocating
an item to an agent with value 1 and leaving an agent with value 3 without an item. If the first agent
visited does not buy, there are two items and two agents left, so p2 must be 0 or else the mechanism risks
leaving an item unallocated. If the first agent does buy, there is one item and two agents, so p2 must be 2
or else the mechanism risks allocating the last item to the second agent when they have value 1 and the
third agent has value 3. Thus, the possible price histories under this (strictly) optimal pricing policy are
(p1 = 2, p2 = 0, p3 = 0), (p1 = 2, p2 = 2), and (p1 = 2, p2 = 2, p3 = 0). The first history has one agent
face price 2 and two agents face price 0, while the third history has the opposite. So, no matter what order
is used, some agent must face price 2 in the first history and price 0 in the third history. Thus, personalized
static prices are insufficient, and adaptive prices are necessary to achieve optimal welfare.
Proposition 3. There exists a unit-demand setting with two identical items and six agents with correlated
valuations where the welfare-optimal SPM must use an adaptive order (but anonymous static prices suffice).
Proof. Consider a unit-demand setting with six agents and two items. Agent 1’s value is drawn uniformly
from {1, 15}. If it’s 15, agent 2’s value is drawn uniformly from {2, 12}; otherwise it is drawn uniformly
from {3, 8}. Agents 3 and 4 are the same as agent 2 but with the distributions switched, so {2, 12} if v1 = 1
and {3, 8} otherwise. Agents 5 and 6 have value 4 deterministically.
An example of a welfare-optimal mechanism is to visit agent 1 first and set price p1 = 3.5. This allocates
to agent 1 iff they have value 15 (if value 1, any other agent is preferred). Then:
• If agent 1 bought, the mechanism visits agent 2 and sets price p2 = 3.5. This allocates to agent 2 iff
they have value 12 (if value 2, any other agent is preferred). If an item remains, visit agents 3,4, and 5
in turn with price p3 = p4 = p5 = 3.5, which will allocate to an agent with value 8 if any exist, else
to agent 5 with value 4.
• If agent 1 did not buy, the mechanism visits agents 3 and 4 in turn with prices p2 = p3 = 3.5. This
allocates to agents 3 and/or 4 iff they have value 12 (if value 2, any other agent is preferred). If any
items remain, visit agents 2,5, and 6 in turn with price p4 = p5 = p6 = 3.5, which will allocate to
agent 2 if they have value 8, else to agents 5 and/or 6 who have value 4.
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Price 3.5 works because it lies between the “high” and “low” values of agents 1-4 and below the values
of agents 5 and 6. Because agents 5 and 6 have higher values (4) than the other agents’ “low” values (1,2,3),
the mechanism would rather allocate to agents 5 or 6 than to an agent with a low value, so the price does not
need to be lower than 3.5. Because the mechanism visits agents in decreasing order of “high” value, agents
1-4 will only purchase an item if they have a “high” value and no other agent has a strictly higher value. So
the price need not be higher.
The key feature of this mechanism is that it infers agent 1’s value from its decision to buy or not, then
uses this information to ensure it visits the {2, 12} agent(s) before the {3, 8} agents. Before observing agent
1’s decision, the mechanism cannot know which agent(s) are {2, 12} and which are {3, 8}.
In particular, any static order mechanism risks visiting one of agents 2-4 while either a) there are at least
two other agents who could have value 12 or 15, or b) there is one item and at least one agent who could
have value 12. In this situation, any price less than 8 risks allocating an item to this agent with value 8 and
leaving an agent with value 12 or 15 without an item. Meanwhile, any price 8 or greater risks not allocating
to this agent when they have value 8 and that is strictly the greatest among remaining agents. Because no
price can ensure optimal welfare in this situation, a static order is insufficient, even with access to adaptive
prices.
Proposition 4. There exists a unit-demand setting with two identical items and four agents with indepen-
dently (non-identically) distributed values where the welfare-optimal SPM must use both adaptive order and
adaptive prices.
Proof. Consider a unit-demand setting with four agents and two items. Agent 1’s value is drawn uniformly
from {1, 15}. Agent 2’s value is drawn uniformly from {3, 12}. Agents 3 and 4 have values drawn uniformly
from {2, 8}. All valuations are independent.
We will build a welfare-optimal mechanism by backwards induction. Because the mechanism knows
each agents’ value distribution when it visits them, it is sufficient to choose between a price below the
agents’ “low” value, one above their “high” value, and one between them. As such, it is sufficient to consider
only prices of 0, 5, and 20. 0 is below all agents’ “low” values, 5 between all “low” and “high” values, and
20 above all “high” values. Notice also that because the items are identical, it is sufficient to consider a
mechanism that sets the same price for each item.
We observe the following fact: Every agents’ “low” value is below every other agents’ expected value.
This implies it is never optimal to set price 0 unless there are as many items as agents — the mechanism
would rather allocate to any of the remaining agents unconditionally than to this agent’s low value. It also
implies it is never optimal to use price 20 when approaching any agent a. If a is the last agent, then of course
price 20 will result in no sale, which means lowering the price to 0 strictly improves welfare. If a is not the
last agent, then let b be the last agent in the sequence. Moving a to the end of the sequence, changing a’s
price from 20 to 0, and changing b’s price from 0 to 5 strictly increases the expected welfare (we replace
allocations to b’s low value with allocations to a). Therefore, a welfare-optimal pricing uses price 5 as long
as there are more agents than items, and drops to price 0 once there are as many items as there are agents.
We use notation V (i, S, x) to denote the expected value obtained by visited agent i ∈ S first when
there’s a set of agents S and x items left. We now perform the backward induction calculation. We simplify
the calculations using the fact that agents 3 and 4 are interchangeable. The following are immediate from
the above discussion:
V (3, {3}, 1) = 5, V (2, {2}, 1) = 7.5, V (1, {1}, 1) = 8, V (3, {3, 4}, 1) = 6.5,
V (2, {2, 3}, 1) = 8.5 > V (3, {2, 3}, 1), V (1, {1, 3}, 1) = 10 > V (3, {1, 3}, 1),
V (1, {1, 2}, 1) = 11.25 > V (2, {1, 2}, 1).
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We now calculate the expected value for situations where we have 1 item and 3 agents left.
V (1, {1, 2, 3}, 1) = 15/2 + V (2, {2, 3}, 1)/2 = 11.75 > max{V (2, {1, 2, 3}, 1), V (3, {1, 2, 3}, 1)},
V (1, {1, 3, 4}, 1) = 15/2 + V (3, {3, 4}, 1)/2 = 10.75 > V (3, {1, 3, 4}, 1),
V (2, {2, 3, 4}, 1) = 12/2 + V (3, {3, 4}, 1)/2 = 9.25 > V (3, {2, 3, 4}, 1).
And now we calculate the expected value for situations where we have 2 items and 3 agents left.
V (1, {1, 2, 3}, 2) = (15+V (2, {2, 3}, 1))/2+(5+7.5)/2 = 18 > max{V (2, {1, 2, 3}, 2), V (3, {1, 2, 3}, 2)},
V (1, {1, 3, 4}, 2) = (15 + V (3, {3, 4}, 1))/2 + (5 + 5)/2 = 15.75 > V (3, {1, 3, 4}, 2),
V (3, {2, 3, 4}, 2) = (8 + V (2, {2, 3}, 1)/2 + (7.5 + 5)/2 = 14.5 > V (2, {2, 3, 4}, 2).
Finally, we calculate the expected welfare of the optimal policy:
V (1, {1, 2, 3, 4}, 2) = (15 + V (2, {2, 3, 4}, 1))/2 + V (3, {2, 3, 4}, 2)/2
= 19.375 > max{V (2, {1, 2, 3, 4}, 2), V (3, {1, 2, 3, 4}, 2)}.
From the above calculation, it shows it is always optimal to approach agent 1 first with a price of 5. If an
item is sold, then the policy approaches agent 2 with a price 5, otherwise, it approaches agent 3 (WLOG
agent 3 and not 4) with a price 5; therefore, the order is adaptive. In the case an item is not sold to agent 1
and not sold to agent 3, then it is optimal to price the item for agent 2 at 0 to extract full surplus. In case
an item is not sold to agent 1 and is sold to agent 3, it is then optimal to price the item for agent 2 at 5.
Therefore, prices are adaptive.
B Omitted Proofs from Section 4
Proposition 5. For agents with independently (non-identically) distributed valuations, with the objective of
maximizing welfare or revenue, a sufficient statistic for the POMDP is the remaining agents and remaining
items.
Proof. When maximizing welfare (revenue), at a current state of the MDP, it is optimal to choose the action
that maximizes the expected welfare (revenue) obtained by selling the remaining items to the yet-to-arrive
agents. This is because the objectives are linear additive. Then, given a set of items and agents with indepen-
dently drawn valuations, an agents’ probability of purchasing an item at a given price is independent of the
history. Because of this, the only relevant information, for any history of observations, is the set of agents
and items left.
Proposition 6. The subclass of SPMs with static, possibly personalized prices, and a static order, corre-
sponds to policies that only have access to the set of remaining agents.
Proof. Without access to the current, partial allocation, neither the agent order nor prices can be adaptive
because they only use information that was known prior to the first policy action. Prices can be personalized,
however, because the same agent can always be visited at a particular position in the order, and thus receive
different prices than other agents.
Proposition 7. There exists a setting where the welfare-optimal SPM cannot be implemented via a policy
that is linear in the allocation matrix and remaining agents.
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Proof. Consider a setting with four agents, Alice, Bob, Carl and Dan, and three items, 1, 2, 3. Alice and Bob
always have value 0 for item 3, and their value for items 1, 2 is distributed uniformly over the following six
options:
vA(1) = 10, vA(2) = 10, vB(1) = 10, vB(2) = 10,
vA(1) = 0, vA(2) = 0, vB(1) = 0, vB(2) = 0,
vA(1) = 10, vA(2) = 0, vB(1) = 0, vB(2) = 0,
vA(1) = 0, vA(2) = 10, vB(1) = 0, vB(2) = 0,
vA(1) = 0, vA(2) = 0, vB(1) = 10, vB(2) = 0,
vA(1) = 0, vA(2) = 0, vB(1) = 0, vB(2) = 10.
The value of Carl and Dan for items 1 and 2 is always 0.
If there exists an allocation for Alice and Bob with welfare 20, or there does not exist an allocation for
Alice and Bob with value larger than 0, then Carl’s value for item 3 is 10 w.p. 1/10 and 0 w.p. 9/10, and
Dan’s value is a constant 5. If the best allocation for Alice and Bob yields welfare 10, Carl and Dan reverse
roles, and Dan’s value for 3 is 10 w.p. 1/10 and 0 w.p. 9/10, and Carl’s value is a constant 5.
In order to extract optimal welfare from Carl and Dan, an optimal policy should order Carl before Dan
if Dan has a constant value 5 for this item, and order Dan before Carl if Carl has a constant value. To get the
correct order in which Carl and Dan should go, an optimal policy should order Alice and Bob first.
Assume by symmetry that the optimal policy orders Alice before Bob, and assume WLOG that if the
optimal attainable welfare by Alice and Bob is 20, then Alice is allocated item 1 and Bob is allocated item 2
(a policy might force a certain allocation for this case, but both items must be allocated). Consider a linear
policy θ. Consider the following four allocation profiles of Alice and Bob: (i) Alice is allocated item 1,
Bob is allocated item 2; (ii) Alice is allocated item 1, Bob is unallocated; (iii) Alice is unallocated, Bob
is allocated item 2; and (iv) Alice and Bob are unallocated. In all four scenarios, all input variables of the
policy are identical, but two variables take on different values, i.e., x1A (x
2
B) takes on value 1 if Alice (Bob)
is allocated item 1 (2) and 0 otherwise.
Recall that we consider policies that calculate scores for each agent given the current input variables,
and approach the highest-score agent of the agents yet to arrive. Let θ1C (θ
1
D) denote the weight multiplied
with variable x1A to determine the score of Carl (Dan), and let θ
2
C (θ
2
D) be the weight multiplied with variable
x2B to determine the score of Carl (Dan). Let θ
−12
C and θ
−12
D be the rest of the weights used to determine the
scores of Carl and Dan, and let x−12 bet the rest of input variables besides x1A and x
2
B .
Since in (i) Carl has a higher score than Dan, we have:
x1A · θ1C + x2B · θ2C + x−12 · θ−12C > x1A · θ1D + x2B · θ2D + x−12 · θ−12D
⇒ θ1C + θ2C + x−12 · θ−12C > θ1D + θ2D + x−12 · θ−12D . (1)
Similarly, from (ii), (iii) and (iv) we have
θ1C + x
−12 · θ−12C < θ1D + x−12 · θ−12D (2)
θ2C + x
−12 · θ−12C < θ2D + x−12 · θ−12D . (3)
x−12 · θ−12C > x−12 · θ−12D (4)
Subtracting Eq. (4) from Eq. (2) gives:
θ1C < θ
1
D. (5)
Adding Eq. (5) to Eq. (3) gives:
θ1C + θ
2
C + x
−12 · θ−12C < θ1D + θ2D + x−12 · θ−12D ,
contradicting Eq (1).
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B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. With correlated valuations, the allocation matrix along with the agents who have not yet re-
ceived an offer is a sufficient statistic, whatever the design objective. Moreover, there exists a unit-demand
setting with correlated valuations where the optimal policy must use a sufficient statistic of size
Ω (max{n,m} log (min{n,m})).
We prove this theorem through Lemma 1, which shows the sufficiency part, and Lemma 2, which gives
a lower bound on the sufficient statistic’s space complexity.
Lemma 1. For any value distribution, the allocation matrix along with the agents who have not yet received
an offer is a sufficient statistic, whatever the design objective.
Proof. The observable history that a policy generates is the agent approached in each round, the prices
offered, and the items purchased (if any). We first notice that given the entire observable history, it is without
loss to assume the optimal policy is deterministic (this follows, for instance, from Bellman [1957]).
We show that for any fixed, deterministic policy, that the allocation information and the list of visited
agents is sufficient to fully recover the entire observable history. Therefore, this information is sufficient
in order to take the optimal action of the optimal policy. The proof is by induction. Observations are agent
visited, prices offered, and item(s) selected by the agent. The base case is the empty history. For the inductive
case, consider that knowledge of the sequence of observations so far and the new allocation matrix and list
of remaining agents reveals the (i) agent just visited, (ii) price offered since the policy is deterministic and
this follows from the sequence of observations so far, and (iii) the item(s) selected by the agent.
We can use this lemma to upper-bound the space complexity of sufficient statistics:
Corollary 1. For unit-demand bidders, there exists an optimal policy that uses a sufficient statistic of space
complexity O(n logm).
Proof. Follows from the fact that the number of allocations of unit-demand bidders in a market with n
agents and m items is O(mn), which takes O(n logm) bits to represent.
Corollary 2. For any valuations of agents, there exists an optimal policy that uses a sufficient statistic of
space complexity O(m log n).
Proof. In every allocation, each item has n+ 1 possible options to be allocated (the +1 is for the option it is
not allocated). Therefore, the number of allocations isO(nm), which takesO(m log n) bits to represent.
Lemma 2. There exists a unit-demand setting with correlated valuations where the optimal policy must use
a sufficient statistic of size Ω (max{n,m} log (min{n,m})).
Proof. Let N = {i1, . . . , in} and M = {1, . . . ,m} be the set of agents and items. In addition, there are
two special agents a and b, and a special item x, who’s value will depend on the matching of agents in N to
items in M .
We first prove the lemma for the case thatm > 2n. The valuations of agents inN are realized as follows:
• Set L = ∅.
• For ` = 1, . . . , n:
1. Choose j` uniformly at random from M \ L.
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2. L := L ∪ {j`}.
3. vi`(j) =
{
1 j`
0 otherwise
.
The agents a and b have an i.i.d. valuation that depends on the matching between N and M , which is a
scaled version of the example in Proposition 1, with item x serving as the item sold in the argument used in
the proof of that proposition. Therefore, depending on the matching between N and M , the price of the first
agent in {a, b} should be different. The number of possible matchings between N and M is(
m
n
)
n! =
m!
(m− n)! = m · (m− 1) · . . . · (m− n+ 1) > (m/2)
n,
where we use the fact that n < m/2 in the last inequality. To represent this many potential prices, we need
a state of size Ω(n logm).
For the case of m = O(n), the construction is very similar to the case that m > 2n. The setting
first draws one of Ω(mn) possible matchings between n and m, and according to the matching drawn, the
algorithm should use a different price for a, b and item x. To represent Ω(mn) possible matchings, we need
Ω(n logm) space.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
A corollary of Corollaries 1, 2, and Lemma 2 is the following.
Corollary 3. The space complexity of the optimal policy’s sufficient statistic for unit-demand bidders is
Θ (max{n,m} log (min{n,m})).
C Experimental Results
In this section, we provide an extended description of the settings we tested in Part 2 and Part 3 of the
experimental section of our paper. When running our experiments, we normalize the valuations such that
the highest possible value is 1. This is done by dividing each value of the settings listed below by the highest
possible value in that setting.
C.1 Part 2: Theory-driven Experiments (Welfare)
Colors. In this environment, there are 30 unit-demand agents, 10 red, 10 yellow, and 10 blue, and there
are also 20 items, these items including 10 red items and 10 yellow items. Red agents have value 1 for each
red item and 0 for each yellow item. Yellow agents have value 1 for each yellow item and 0 for each red
item. The valuation of each blue agent is defined as follows:
• Draw x ∼ U [0, 1].
• With probability x, the agent has value 2 for each red item and 0 for each yellow one. Otherwise, the
agent has value 2 the yellow items and 0 the red ones.
In a welfare-optimal allocation, each blue agent receives their preferred item type and the remaining
red items go to red agents and yellow items to yellow agents. The optimal social welfare is 30. In this
environment, there exists an optimal static SPM that prices p ∈ (0, 1) each item and lets blue agents go first.
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Two Worlds. In this environment, there are 10 unit-demand agents and 1 item. Valuations are realized as
follows:
• With probability 1/2, we are “high regime:” each value is drawn uniformly at random from the set
{0.6, 1}.
• Otherwise, we are in “low regime,” and each value is drawn uniformly at random from the set
{0.1, 0.4}.
For a welfare-optimal allocation, it is enough to use a static SPM with personalized prices, e.g., pi = 0.9
for i ∈ {1, .., 5} and pi = 0.2 for i ∈ {6, .., 10}.
Inventory. In this environment, we have 20 unit-demand agents and 10 identical items. Each agent’s value
is drawn uniformly at random from the set {1/2, 1}. Here, a welfare-optimal SPM needs to adapt prices
depending on agents’ purchases: In the first few rounds, each item is priced p ∈ (0.5, 1). Then, when the
number of remaining items is equal to the number of remaining agents, the price is lowered to below 0.5.
Note that this welfare-optimal outcome cannot be achieved by a personalized, static price mechanism, as
the number of the round at which the price should drop depends on the agents’ demand and cannot be
determined ex ante.
Kitchen Sink. This environment consists of 3 unit-demand agents and 3 non-identical items A, B, and C.
The agent valuations are realized as follows:
• With probability 1/2, agent 1 has value 0.01 for A, agent 2 has value 1 for C and agent 3 values item
C either 5 (with probability 0.2) or 0.5 (with probability 0.8). All the other values are 0.
• Otherwise, agent 1 has value 0.01 for B, agent 3 has value 0.499 for C and agent 2 values item C
either 2 (with probability 0.2) or 0 (with probability 0.8). All the other values are 0.
Here, a welfare-optimal SPM needs to adapt both the order and the prices. First, agent 1 is considered
with price 0 for all items. Then,
• If agent 1 buys item A, the mechanism should visit agent 3 with a price between 0.5 and 5 for item
C , and finally consider agent 2 with a price smaller than 1 for item C (the price for item B can be
arbitrary for agents 1,2).
• If agent 1 buys B, the mechanism should visit agent 2 with a price between 0 and 2 for item C, and
finally consider agent 3 with a price smaller than 1 for item C (the price for item B can be arbitrary
for agents 1,2). .
ID. This environment consists of 6 unit-demand agents and 2 identical items. The value of agents 1, 2, and
3 for either one of these items is drawn uniformly at random from the set {0, 60}, while the value of agents
4, 5, and 6 is realized as follows:
• If only agent 1 has value 60, then agent 4’s value is drawn uniformly at random from the set {40, 0},
and the values of agents 5 and 6 are drawn uniformly at random from the set {21, 0}.
• If only agent 2 has value 60, then agent 5’s value is drawn uniformly at random from the set {40, 0},
and the values of agents 4 and 6 are drawn uniformly at random from the set {21, 0}.
• If only agent 3 has value 60, then agent 6’s value is drawn uniformly at random from the set {40, 0},
and the values of agents 4 and 5 are drawn uniformly at random from the set {21, 0}.
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• Otherwise, the value of agents 4, 5, and 6, are all 0.
The welfare-optimal mechanism first considers agents 1, 2, and 3, with an identical price between 0 and
60 for both items.
• If only agent 1 takes an item, then, agent 4 should be visited before agents 5 and 6, with a price
between 0 and 40, and then agents 5 and 6 should be visited with a price between 0 and 21.
• If only agent 2 takes an item, then, agent 5 should be visited before agents 4 and 6, with a price
between 0 and 40, and then agents 4 and 6 should be visited with a price between 0 and 21.
• If only agent 3 takes an item, then, agent 6 should be visited before agents 4 and 5, with a price
between 0 and 40, and then agents 4 and 5 should be visited with a price between 0 and 21.
Note that this mechanism cannot be implemented by a policy that only accesses information about the
remaining agents and items.
C.2 Part 3: Beyond Unit-demand, and Beyond Welfare Maximization.
Additive-across-types. This environment consists of 10 agents, 2 units of item A, and 4 units of item B.
Agents’ valuations are additive across types and unit-demand within types, meaning that an agent’s value
for a bundle x is given by the sum of the agent’s value for item A, if x contains at least one unit of item A,
and the agent’s value for item B, if x contains at least one unit of item B. Each agent’s values for each item
type is distributed as in the simple correlated setting, with correlation parameter δ = 0.5.
Revenue Maximization. Here we use the same settings with 20 agents and 5 identical items we used in
the simple correlated setting, with δ = 0.5.
Max-Min Fairness In this environment, there are 9 unit-demand agents of which we say that one of the
agents is ‘orange‘, four of the agents are ‘blue‘, and four of the agents are ‘red,‘ and there are five black
items and five white items. Agent values are realized as follows:
• With probability 1/2:
– The value of the orange agent for the black items is U [0.5, 1] and its value for the white items is
0.
– Blue agents’ values are drawn i.i.d. from the distribution U [0.4, 0.5] for black items, and from
U [0, 0.25] for the white items.
– Red agents’ values are drawn i.i.d. from U [0.9, 1] for the black items, and from U [0.4, 0.5] for
the white items.
• Otherwise: (switching roles)
– The value of the orange agent for the black items is 0 and for the white items is U [0.5, 1].
– Red agents’ values are drawn i.i.d. from the distribution U [0.4, 0.5] for black items, and from
U [0, 0.25] for the white items.
– Blue agents’ values are drawn i.i.d. from U [0.9, 1] for the black items, and from U [0.4, 0.5] for
the white items.
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An optimal SPM visits the orange agent first with price 0. If this agent takes a black item, the mechanism
next visits blue agents, letting them take all the remaining black items. Otherwise, if the orange agent takes
a white item, the mechanism should consider the red agents next, letting them take all the black items.
The max-min welfare of such a mechanism is ≥ 0.4, as this is the minimal welfare any agent can get.
Under a static SPM, the max-min welfare of at most 0.25. If, for instance, the orange agent takes a black
item and then some red agents arrive before blue agents, red agents might take more black items, which
results in a blue agent taking a white item and yields a max-min welfare of at most 0.25.
D Characterization Results for Personalized Static Price (PSP) Mechanisms
We further characterize the class of Personalized Static Price (PSP) mechanisms with results that do not
appear in the main paper. In Proposition 4 we show that both adaptive prices and adaptive order are needed
when maximizing welfare with identical items and independently drawn unit-demand valuations. We show
that in the same setting, if we restrict ourselves to mechanisms in the PSP class, adaptive order is not needed
(Proposition 8). If, however, the items are non-identical (Proposition 9), or the valuations are correlated
(Proposition 3 in the main paper), then adaptive order might be needed.
Proposition 8. For independently distributed unit-demand valuations and identical items, there exists an
optimal PSP mechanism that uses static order.
Proof. We show that for independently distributed unit-demand valuations and identical items, an optimal
policy is to order the agents according to the expected value conditioned on being allocated. This implies
there exists an optimal static order.
For this, fix prices τ . For player i, let vi = E [v ∼ Fi|v > pi], and let qi = Pr[v ∼ Fi > pi]. Given
a set of agents S and a number of items m, let V (S,m) be the expected welfare of the optimal (possibly
adaptive) ordering for set S and m items. We prove by induction that for any set S and any m, it is always
(weakly) better to have an agent in argmaxi∈Svi first. For two buyers, 1 and 2, where v1 > v2, this is
true. If m ≥ 2, it doesn’t matter who goes first. If m = 1, then the expected welfare from having 1
go first is q1v1 + (1 − q1)q2v2, and symmetrically, if agent 2 goes first, we have an expected welfare of
q2v2+(1−q2)q1v1. We have that the difference between the first and the second terms is q1q2v1−q1q2v2 > 0,
which implies it is better to have agent 1 go first.
For an arbitrary S and m, we compare the benefit of having agent 1 ∈ argmaxi∈Svi going first to an
agent j with vj < v1. First, we show the claim for m = 1. The expected welfare from having 1 go first is
q1v1 + (1− q1)V (S \ {1}, 1) ≥ q1v1 + (1− q1)qjvj + (1− q1)(1− qj)V (S \ {1, j}, 1).
The expected welfare from having agent j go first is
qjvj + (1− qj)V (S \ {j}, 1) = qjvj + (1− qj)q1v1 + (1− q1)(1− qj)V (S \ {1, j}, 1),
where the equality follows from the induction hypothesis, where we assume it’s optimal for agent 1 to go
first for a smaller set. Subtracting the second term from the first term, we get q1qjv1− q1qjvj > 0, implying
it’s strictly better for agent 1 to go first.
If m ≥ 2, then letting agent 1 go first, we get an expected welfare of
q1v1 + q1V (S \ {1},m− 1) + (1− q1)V (S \ {1},m) ≥ q1v1 + q1qj(vj + V (S \ {1, j},m− 2))
+ q1(1− qj)V (S \ {1, j},m− 1)
+ (1− q1)qj(vj + V (S \ {1, j},m− 1))
+ (1− q1)(1− qj)V (S \ {1, j},m).
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Letting agent j go first results in an expected welfare of
qjvj + qjV (S \ {j},m− 1) + (1− qj)V (S \ {j},m) = qjvj + q1qj(v1 + V (S \ {1, j},m− 2))
+ qj(1− q1)V (S \ {1, j},m− 1)
+ (1− qj)q1(v1 + V (S \ {1, j},m− 1))
+ (1− q1)(1− qj)V (S \ {1, j},m),
where the equality follows the induction hypothesis. Subtracting the second term from the first, we get a
difference in welfare of at least
q1v1 + q1qjvj + (1− q1)qjvj − qjvj + q1qjv1 + (1− qj)q1v1 = 0,
which implies it’s weakly better to have agent 1 go first.
Since it’s always weakly better to have the agent with the highest value go first, it implies there exists an
optimal static ordering, where agents arrive according to descending values.
Proposition 9. There exists a unit-demand setting with 2 non-identical items and three agents with inde-
pendent valuations where the optimal SPS mechanism must use adaptive order.
Proof. There are three agents: blue, red, and yellow. There are two items: red and yellow. With prob. 1/2,
the blue agent has value 15 for the red item and 1 for the yellow item, and with prob. 1/2 it’s the other way
around. The red agent’s value for the red item is drawn uniformly from {12, 3} and its value for the yellow
item is drawn uniformly from {8, 2}. The yellow agent is the same as the red except the distributions are
switched, so {12, 3} for the yellow item and {8, 2} for the red item. The welfare-optimal policy is to have
the blue agent go first, with any price p < 15 set for each of the items. One of the items will be sold. If the
red item remains, visit the red agent next, with price 3 < p < 12, and if this agent does not buy this item,
visit the yellow agent with price p < 2. Do the opposite if it is the yellow item that remains after the blue
agent goes.
Intuitively, after the blue agent goes, we want to visit the agent who is the same color as the remaining
item because they have the highest potential value. It is insufficient to use a static because we don’t know
for sure which of the yellow or red agents has the higher value for the item.
24
